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THE MORAL STANDPOINT
OF EURIPIDES. 1906

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# THE
# MORAL STANDPOINT OF EURIPIDES

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# THE MORAL STANDPOINT OF EURIPIDES

BY

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# PREFACE

THIS pamphlet consists of two parts: (*a*) the essay proper, dealing with the views of Euripides himself on blind *ἀνάγκη* and the intelligent *φύσις* of man: (*b*) the index, which will enable the reader to form his own conclusions about contemporary morality. I am well aware that pp. 11–29 deal with controversial matter which it is extremely difficult to discuss in a few pages. I can only hope that the reader will test my statements by referring to the passages mentioned in the index, bearing in mind the important fact that cumulative evidence must take precedence over every other consideration. E.g. the fact that the Theseus of the *Suppliants* believes in the gods and their care for men must not outweigh the many indications, in other plays, in Aristophanes and in Lucian, that Euripides himself took the opposite view.

I believe that Euripides, writing during the period which gave birth to Greek ethics, reflects the tendencies which were afterwards developed by philosophers. Herein lie the interest and importance of the poet's own views.

I may publish similar indexes to the other non-philosophic Greek writers, probably without comment.

The references throughout are to Nauck (Teubner series).

W. H. S. JONES.

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Κρεῖσσον οὐδὲν ἀνάγκας.

*Alc.* 965.

οὔποτε θνητοῖς
ἀρετῆς ἄλλη δύναμις μείζων.

*Fr.* 449.

μέγιστον ἆρ' ἦν ἡ φύσις.

*Fr.* 807.

τέλος δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

*Hel.* 887.

Blind ἀνάγκη )( the intelligent φύσις of man.

# INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Euripides was born in the year 480 B.C. He won his first prize for tragedy in 441, and died 407–406. The dates of the extant plays are as follows:—

*Alcestis*, 438.
*Medea*, 431.
*Hippolytus*, 428 (?).
*Hecuba*, 423 or earlier.
*Heraclidae*, date uncertain, but early.
*Supplices*, 421–420.
*Hercules Furens*, date uncertain, but earlier than 416.
*Andromache*, date uncertain, but between 431 and 421.
*Troades*, 415.
*Ion*, not later than 412.
*Electra*, *Helena*, *Phoenissae* } date uncertain, but traditionally assigned to the period 413–409.
*Iphigenia in Tauris*, 418–412.
*Orestes*, 408.
*Iphigenia in Aulide* appeared after 406.
*Bacchae* appeared after the death of Euripides.
*Cyclops*, a satyric play of uncertain date.
*Rhesus*, probably spurious.

There seems to be no reason for supposing, with Berlage, that Euripides was not at first opposed to the popular religion. Contempt for the 'gods' is almost as clearly marked in the *Alcestis* as in later plays.[1] It is also impossible to regard the *Bacchae* as a palinode, for Dionysus is a fiend.[2]

[1] See the whole of the prologue, and especially the humorous sarcasm of ll. 39, 40—

ΘΑ. *τί δῆτα τόξων ἔργον, εἰ δίκην ἔχεις;*
ΑΠ. *σύνηθες ἀεὶ ταῦτα βαστάζειν ἐμοί.*

[2] It is possible that the influence he exercises is intended to be looked upon as mesmerism.

# THE
# MORAL STANDPOINT OF EURIPIDES

(B 575)

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καὶ πάλιν,

Ζεύς, ὅστις ὁ Ζεύς, οὐ γὰρ οἶδα, πλὴν λόγῳ
κλύων.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Longinus, *de Sublim.* c. 15, 3—

ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν φιλοπονώτατος ὁ Εὐριπίδης δύο ταυτὶ πάθη, μανίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας, ἐκτραγῳδῆσαι.

Clemens Alex. *Strom.* v. p. 688—

ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς φιλόσοφος Εὐριπίδης.

§ Chief Modern Authorities:—

Berlage, *De Euripide Philosopho.*
Decharme, *Euripide et l'Esprit de son Théâtre.*
Mahaffy, *Euripides.*
Thomson, *Euripides and the Attic Orators.*
Verrall, *Euripides the Rationalist.*
*Four Plays of Euripides.*
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Herakles.*

# THE MORAL STANDPOINT OF EURIPIDES

The characteristics of the period when Euripides wrote.

THE culmination of the period of Greek 'enlightenment' coincided roughly with the Peloponnesian War. Philosophy had attempted to give a rational account of the universe. The Athenian mind had been developed by the increased experience afforded by the expansion of the Empire and the rapid growth of democracy. This development was followed by the horrors of war and plague, the former lasting for nearly thirty years. The result was a time of doubt, inquiry, and scepticism. Tradition was no longer blindly accepted as a guide of life, and the old ideals were subjected to the scrutiny of the reason. Men lost faith in their religion, and accordingly began to question the validity of the moral law which that religion sanctioned. So much may be gathered from Thucydides.[1] Among the more cultured classes, who were familiar with philosophic speculation, moral doubt took a form which was intimately connected with the doctrine of the atomistic school[2] — a doctrine which tended to result in scepticism. With some differences of detail these critics of current morality agreed in the conclusion that righteousness, in the ordinary sense of the term, had merely a conventional existence. No sanction could be found for it in nature

[1] Thucydides ii. 53. Cf. also iii. 82–84 and v. 105.

[2] Democritus *apud* Sext. *Math.* vii. 135 *νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.*

(φύσις).[1] But the life of animals, and the primary instincts of men, show that 'nature' points to a new kind of morality, the essence of which is that 'might is right.' Plato, in spite of his disgust, has formulated these theories with admirable candour.[2]

Criteria of Euripides' own views.

Now the dates of the extant plays of Euripides fall roughly within the limits of the Peloponnesian War, and they form an excellent mirror of the prevalent atmosphere, mental, moral, and religious. But Euripides was a poet as well as a philosopher, and he left behind him dramas, not scientific treatises. It would accordingly be unreasonable to expect that his works contain a clearly defined philosophic system. On the other hand it must not be too readily assumed that his mind was a chaos of contradictions and inconsistencies. Every great thinker who has thought fit to leave his readers to draw their own conclusions deserves to have such an assumption kept as a last resource. I hope to show that in the case of Euripides we are not reduced to this extremity. But before proceeding, a few words are necessary about the criteria by which the views of the poet himself may be recognised.

Decharme gives two such criteria[3]—

(1) The occurrence of an idea several times in plays of different date, especially when it is dwelt upon with evident satisfaction.

(2) The expression of a sentiment which does not harmonise with the age or nature of the speaker.

The results of these criteria are valuable merely as preliminary hypotheses. From them must be formed a theory of Euripides' attitude towards various moral problems, and then this theory must be further tested by application to all the obtainable evidence. This may

[1] For the contrast between νόμος and φύσις see Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers* vol. i. pp. 402 foll. (Engl. trans.). See also Additional Note I.

[2] *Gorgias* 482 C–486 D: *Republic* 338 D foll.

[3] *Euripide et l'Esprit de son Théâtre* pp. 25–28. All the conclusions of the following pages are the result of the application of these criteria.

lead to the abandonment of the theory. Perhaps only correction is necessary. Or again every test may be fully satisfied. The important thing to notice is the danger of attempting to discover the views of the poet from one passage, or even from a comparison of several passages. Such a comparison is merely a necessary preliminary to the formation of a provisional hypothesis, which renewed examination of all the plays, undertaken in the light of that hypothesis, will verify, modify, or condemn. An example will make my meaning clear. An examination of particular quotations might lead to the hypothesis that Euripides was a woman-hater. But the question must not be considered settled. If the poet be re-read in order to test this hypothesis it becomes clear that the conclusion was erroneous.

It is evident that account must be taken of the circumstances in which any character utters an opinion. I should not mention so obvious a platitude were it not for the fact that many writers of repute quote the fragments as evidence for the views of Euripides. But the fragments can be used only as confirmatory tests bearing out conclusions reached on other grounds. A skilful pleader could use the fragments to prove that Euripides believed anything or nothing. They are excellent witnesses to the fluidity of contemporary thought, but they cannot, in the absence of their context, be employed to make out a charge of inconsistency against Euripides.

The object of the present essay is to try to explain why Euripides, while cordially agreeing with those who denied the existence of the gods, and fully convinced that there was a real contrast between *νόμος* and *φύσις*, nevertheless refused to infer, either that there was no such thing as right and wrong, or that the only true 'right' was 'might.'[1]

[1] That Euripides did not sympathise with the moral degeneration noticed by Thucydides is clearly proved by the tone of *Medea* 410 foll. This play

Euripides and religion.

A fundamental question in any system of morals is whether or no divine powers sanction moral conduct. From Homer downwards it was a common Hellenic belief that the gods, or at least some divine power, rewarded right and punished wrong. In spite of the painful fact that the righteous are often unhappy and the wicked prosperous, this belief held its ground until the period of 'enlightenment.' In order to make clear the attitude of Euripides towards this important question it is necessary first to distinguish some of the many heterogeneous elements of which the Hellenic faith was composed—

(1) There is, first, nature-worship, which developed into the worship of the Olympic pantheon. Generally speaking, conformity to this belief was a State duty.

(2) A second component is ancestor-worship, which was a family duty.

(3) A third component is a belief in ὁ θεός or τὸ θεῖον,[1] that mighty 'power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness.' Here belief or disbelief was an affair for the individual conscience.

There can be no doubt that Euripides regarded the received State religion as an unmixed evil. Lengthy discussion is unnecessary, for the main contentions of Dr. Verrall are now generally accepted. But a brief summary of the evidence will be useful—

(1) The real action of a Euripidean play does not require the intervention of divine beings.

(2) The gods that take part in the prologues and ostensible *dénouements* are mere stage-machinery.

came out in the year before the plague. One of the choral odes laments the disappearance of the old moral virtues—

ἄνω ποταμῶν ἱερῶν χωροῦσι παγαί,
καὶ δίκα καὶ πάντα πάλιν στρέφεται.
ἀνδρασι μὲν δόλιαι βουλαί, θεῶν δ'
οὐκέτι πίστις ἅραρε.

410–413.

[1] Of course this component also is closely connected with nature-worship.

Their whole presentation has an unnatural, conventional appearance. Verrall, *Euripides the Rationalist* p. 138 'It is not too much to say that on the Euripidean stage whatever is said by a divinity is *ipso facto* discredited. It is in all cases objectionable from the author's point of view, and almost always a lie.'

(3) The legends are constantly shown to be immoral. This immorality is both implied and also definitely stated in cases where the whole evidence tends to show that Euripides is declaring his own sentiment.

(4) Euripides was accused by Aristophanes of 'atheism.'[1]

(5) Lucian expresses a similar opinion.[2]

It is certain that Euripides was utterly opposed to the national religion on the ground that the legends associated therewith were immoral. Xenophanes and Pindar had refused to believe in unworthy legends; Euripides seems to have insisted that (*a*) if the legends were true, the persons of the legends could not be gods; (*b*) if they were not true, the Olympic pantheon had no support.[3] Whether divine powers existed or not was another question.

[1] νῦν δ' οὗτος ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιῶν
τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀναπέπεικεν οὐκ εἶναι θεούς.
*Thesm.* 450.

Cf. the 'prayer' of Euripides in the *Frogs* 892.

[2] In *Zeus Tragoedus* § 41, where one of the characters declares that the presence of the gods on the Euripidean stage does not prove that Euripides himself believed in them.

[3] τὰ Ταντάλου θεοῖσιν ἐστιάματα
ἄπιστα κρίνω, παιδὸς ἡσθῆναι βορᾷ.
τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ', αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀνθρωποκτόνους,
εἰς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ·
οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.
*Iph. T.* 387.

δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός,
οὐδενός· ἀοιδῶν οἵδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.
*Her. F.* 1345.

εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσιν αἰσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί.
*Fr.* 294.

With the second component of Hellenic faith, ancestor-worship and the hope of immortality it implied, Euripides dealt in a spirit of greater tolerance. In the *Suppliants* he certainly sympathises with the Argives, who wish to recover their dead from the Thebans for the purpose of burial. Theonoë respects the feelings of her dead father, and gives as her reason that 'although the mind of the dead lives not, yet it has an immortal intelligence, having fallen into the immortal aether.'[1] Elsewhere Euripides suggests that death is the true life.[2] Sometimes, on the other hand, his characters express the belief, or even the hope, that death is extinction.[3] In brief, since men can have only a hope of immortality, Euripides will not commit himself to a definite statement.

The views of Euripides about the existence of God are not quite so easily discovered. Looking out upon the Universe he saw at work law, force, 'necessity,' as he calls it.[4] But he does not appear to have predicated of this force any moral qualities. 'Necessity is inflexible,'[5] but I can find only one passage where *ἀνάγκη* is regarded as a moral force. This is the remarkable prayer of Hecuba

> Ζεύς, ὅστις ὁ Ζεύς, οὐ γὰρ οἶδα πλὴν λόγῳ.
> *Fr.* 483.
>
> φησὶν τις εἶναι δῆτ' ἐν οὐρανῷ θεούς;
> οὐκ εἰσίν, οὐκ εἰσ', εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων θέλει
> μὴ τῷ παλαίῳ μῶρος ὢν χρῆσθαι λόγῳ.
> *Fr.* 288.
>
> [1] ὁ νοῦς
> τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει
> ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών.
> *Hel.* 1014.

Cf. also the prayer to the dead Alcestis, *Alc.* 995–1005.

[2] *Fr.* 639, 830.

[3] *Fr.* 536, *Heraclid.* 592.

[4] ἐγὼ καὶ διὰ μούσας
καὶ μετάρσιος ᾖξα, καὶ
πλείστων ἀψάμενος λόγων
κρεῖσσον οὐδὲν Ἀνάγκας
ηὗρον κτλ.
*Alc.* 962.

[5] στερρὰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη.
*Hec.* 1295.

in the *Trojan Women*,[1] and it should be carefully noticed that this evidence is not conclusive, as doubt is expressed whether the 'power that makes for righteousness' is *ἀνάγκη φύσεος* or *νοῦς βροτῶν*, and it will be seen that there is every reason for supposing that Euripides took the latter view. For in the *Hippolytus* the chorus would indeed like to believe in a Providence, but feel that they cannot.[2] Talthybius suspects that *τύχη* is supreme among men.[3] There are many other passages to the same effect. In one (*Fr.* 508) it is said that Zeus does not maintain *δίκη*. *δίκη* is near us. Practically the only character who consistently declares that the gods exercise providence over the world is the Theseus of the *Suppliants*.[4] Therefore, by Decharme's criterion, this view is probably not the view of Euripides (see pp. 12, 13). 'Athena,' of course, declares that 'though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small,'[5] but in the words of Dr. Verrall, what she says is *ipso facto* discredited.

[1] ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν,
ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
προσευξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου
βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις.
*Tro.* 884.

Cf. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός.
*Fr.* 1007.

[2] ἦ μέγα μοι τὰ θεῶν μελεδήμαθ', ὅταν φρένας ἔλθῃ,
λύπας παραιρεῖ.
ξύνεσιν δέ τιν' ἐλπίδι κεύθων
λείπομαι ἔν τε τύχαις θνατῶν καὶ ἐν ἔργμασι λεύσσων.
*Hipp.* 1102.

[3] ὦ Ζεῦ, τί λέξω; πότερά σ' ἀνθρώπους ὁρᾶν;
ἢ δόξαν ἄλλως τήνδε κεκτῆσθαι μάτην
ψευδῆ, δοκοῦντας δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος,
τύχην δὲ πάντα τἀν βροτοῖς ἐπισκοπεῖν;
*Hec.* 488.

πῶς οὖν τάδ' εἰσορῶντες ἢ θεῶν γένος
εἶναι λέγωμεν ἢ νόμοισι χρώμεθα;
*Fr.* 893.

ὤφειλε δῆθεν, εἴπερ ἔστ' ἐν οὐρανῷ
Ζεύς, μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν (ἐσθλὸν Heimsoethius) δυστυχῆ καθεστάναι.
*Fr.* 892.

[4] *Supplices* 296, 594.

[5] *Ion* 1614. It is to be carefully noticed that arguments which prove that *οἱ θεοί* do not exercise providence usually hold good of *τὸ θεῖον* or *ἀνάγκη*.

It seems most likely that Euripides conceived God to be the blind force of nature (φύσις),[1] enforcing law and order indeed, but not exercising providence or sanctioning morality. But besides this 'natural' φύσις there is another, the φύσις of humanity. In this direction is to be sought the answer of Euripides to those who maintained the thesis that might is right.

The beauty of moral conduct.

But against those who inferred that the absence of a divine sanction implied the non-existence of morality, Euripides asserted that apart from the question of its origin moral conduct is beautiful, and therefore good.[2] A striking characteristic of Euripides' plays is the appeal they make to human pity. The poet loves to place virtue in the direst extremities, and hold it up for admiration as a lovely thing. The happiness or unhappiness of the agent, his life or death, the favour, hatred or neglect of the unseen power which rules the universe, can have no effect upon the excellence of his conduct. We are reminded of Plato's description of the unrighteous man who has all the rewards of righteousness, and of the righteous man who suffers all the consequences of unrighteousness,[3] and the philosopher's firm conviction that, even though the gods have no knowledge of the state of the two men, nevertheless ἄμεινον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας. The character of Macaria in the *Children of Heracles* is a typical example. Voluntarily submitting to an awful death, a death only necessary because of the stupid superstition of the age, in order that she may save her kindred, she goes to her doom without lamentation or repining. Although she has no

[1] ὁρᾷς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα
καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχουθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις;
τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.
*Fr.* 935.

[2] Compare with this the aesthetic character of Greek philosophical ethics. See Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life*, pp. 134, 144. Cf. Arist. *Ethics* 1101 a.

[3] *Republic* 367 E μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐνδείξῃ μόνον τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, ἐάν τε λανθάνῃ ἐάν τε μὴ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ἡ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡ δὲ κακὸν ἐστιν.

hope—nay, not even a wish[1]—that there may be a life beyond the grave, she is comforted by the knowledge that her action is beautiful.[2] Hence she refuses to take her chance by having lots cast for a victim. Were she doomed to die by lot her conduct would lose its beauty.[3]

Here and in other passages[4] Euripides shows that he had a clear conception of the beauty and glory of heroic pain, even though the sufferer have no hope of future reward or belief in a divine Providence. Aristotle seems to recognise this when he calls Euripides 'the most tragic of poets.'[5]

Such I take to have been the reply of Euripides to those who thought that morality had no sanction apart from religion. Morality, he says, be its origin what it may, is beautiful. But with those who sought for an origin in φύσις, and who would have changed moral values so as to harmonise them with the law of φύσις, Euripides is partly, but only partly, in agreement. φύσις in the sense of natural law he held to be non-moral. If φύσις, on the other hand, be regarded as the primary instincts of sentient life, the conclusion must be drawn that 'might is right,' and no reader of Euripides could possibly imagine that he sympathised with such a view. Morality springs up in human φύσις, but all impulses are not necessarily moral. The moral part of φύσις he calls φρήν or νοῦς.

Although he feels unable to decide how great the influence of training and circumstances may be,[6]

[1] εἴ τι δὴ κάτω χθονός·
εἴη γε μέντοι μηδέν.
*Heraclid.* 592.

[2] εὕρημα γάρ τοι μὴ φιλοψυχοῦσ' ἐγὼ
κάλλιστον ἠῦρηκ', εὐκλεῶς λιπεῖν βίον.
*Ibid.* 533.

[3] οὐκ ἂν θάνοιμι τῇ τύχῃ λαχοῦσ' ἐγώ·
χάρις γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι.
*Ibid.* 547.

[4] e.g. the speech of Cassandra, *Tro.* 353–405.

[5] Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453 a τραγικώτατός γε τῶν ποιητῶν φαίνεται.

[6] See *Hecuba* 592–602.

Euripides seems to have regarded *ἀρετή*[1] as something arising out of the human *φύσις*, being always present potentially, but needing careful training in suitable circumstances if it is to reach its highest perfection. This training results in a healthy *φρήν*, so that sometimes *νοῦς*, *φρήν* and *φύσις* are virtually equivalents (cf. notes 5 and 2. 4. 6).

Morality and the human *φύσις*.

What test, says Orestes,[2] can be found for manliness? Birth, wealth, prowess in arms, are all unsafe criteria. It can only exist in *φύσις* and *εὐψυχία*. Electra holds that not money, but only *φύσις*, is stable.[3] Euripides seems to have dwelt with peculiar affection upon the character of Theonoë, and she grounds her conduct upon the 'mighty temple' of *δίκη*, which is in her *φύσις*.[4] In an interesting passage of the *Trojan Women* Hecuba reproves Helen for throwing the guilt of her adultery upon Aphrodite. It was the mind of Helen that made her fall when she saw the exceeding beauty of Paris.[5] The Tiresias of the *Bacchanals* declares that it is not Dionysus who makes women chaste. Chastity lies in *φύσις*.[6] Hippolytus says that only those may cull the sacred flowers who

[1] And not virtue only, but vice as well. See Additional Note II.

[2] See the remarkable speech, *Electra* 367–390, with its conclusion

*ἐν τῇ φύσει δὲ τοῦτο κἂν εὐψυχίᾳ.*

[3]
*ἡ γὰρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα.*
*Electra* 941.

[4]
*ἐγὼ πέφυκά τ' εὐσεβεῖν καὶ βούλομαι,*
*φιλῶ τ' ἐμαυτήν, καὶ κλέος τοὐμοῦ πατρὸς*
*οὐκ ἂν μιάναιμ', οὐδὲ συγγόνῳ χάριν*
*δοίην ἂν ἐξ ἧς δυσκλεὴς φανήσεται.*
*ἔνεστι δ' ἱερὸν τῆς δίκης ἐμοὶ μέγα*
*ἐν τῇ φύσει.*
*Hel.* 998.

For Euripides and 'Theonoë,' see Verrall, *Four Plays of Euripides*, pp. 78, 79, 80, 87.

[5]
*ἦν οὐμὸς υἱὸς κάλλος ἐκπρεπέστατος,*
*ὁ σὸς δ' ἰδών νιν νοῦς ἐποιήθη Κύπρις.*
*Tro.* 987.

[6]
*οὐχ ὁ Διόνυσος σωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει*
*γυναῖκας ἐς τὴν Κύπριν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει*
*τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἔνεστιν εἰς τὰ πάντ' ἀεί.*
*Bacchae* 314.

have chastity in their φύσις.[1] Surely all this testimony points to the conclusion that Euripides regarded human nature as the source of moral ideas, although the evidence may also justify the hypothesis that τὸ θεῖον has planted the seed of these ideas in the human φύσις as it were in a suitable soil. I think that such a view is hard to maintain in the face of Euripides' attitude towards Providence, but even though it be accepted, the conclusions which I am about to draw still remain valid.

To test my hypothesis it is necessary to apply it to some characteristic tenets of Euripides. If it harmonises with them, explains them and groups them into a unity, it is probably also correct.

(a) φρήν as judge.

If human nature be the ultimate source of moral ideas, it follows that developed human nature (νοῦς, φρήν) is the final arbiter of moral problems. That Euripides held this to be true can be inferred from the fact that he actually does criticise the current religion and current institutions upon moral grounds. Aristophanes makes the poet pray that 'understanding and keen-scented nostrils' may be his guide in the coming contest between himself and Aeschylus.[2]

Spirit and Letter.

It is from the supremacy of the developed human φύσις in the moral sphere that arises the true opposition between φύσις and νόμος. As human nature progresses, it condemns existing institutions and customs, all of which have a conservative tendency. Hence the necessity of distinguishing outward conformity with νόμος from the conviction of the heart, the letter of the law from its spirit. In this light ought to be interpreted that much

1 ὅσοις . . . ἐν τῇ φύσει
τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν εἰς τὰ πάνθ' ὁμῶς,
τούτοις δρέπεσθαι, τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις.
*Hipp.* 79.

2 αἰθήρ, ἐμὸν βόσκημα, καὶ γλώττης στρόφιγξ,
καὶ ξύνεσι καὶ μυκτῆρες ὀσφραντήριοι,
ὀρθῶς μ' ἐλέγχειν ὧν ἂν ἅπτωμαι λόγων.
*Frogs* 892.

Cf. 971 foll.

abused outcry of Hippolytus,[1] 'My tongue hath sworn, but my mind had no part in the oath.' In a similar way the other line which aroused so much opposition in antiquity, 'What is shameful that appears not so to them that use it?'[2] may simply mean that, after all, human beings, who form the sphere of *τὸ αἰσχρόν*, are the sole judges of what *τὸ αἰσχρόν* is, or as Aristotle might have put it, *ὁ φρόνιμος* is the final authority. If the human soul be the origin of all morality, it follows that the condition of the soul is of more moment than any outward act. The intention of the agent is the all-important moral factor.

Sanctuary. This refusal to believe in the moral value of outward acts led Euripides to condemn a custom which Greece had held in reverence from the most remote antiquity. Ion is convinced that sanctuary, and the immunity it confers, ought to be limited to those who are righteous.[3] But who or what can distinguish the righteous from the unrighteous? Obviously only the human mind. In fact, the mere criticism of religious institutions on moral grounds implies that the critic places his own moral sense above tradition or authority.

Divination. The rejection of the Olympic gods implied the rejection of their accredited interpreters to men, the oracles and the diviners. But there is another reason why Euripides attacked divination and soothsaying. The difficulties propounded to a *μάντις* were often concerned with moral issues. A typical instance is the question put to the Pythia by the Spartan Glaucus,[4] who asked

1 *ἡ γλῶττ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.* *Hipp.* 612.

2 *τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ;* *Fr.* 19.

3 *φεῦ.*
*δεινόν γε, θνητοῖς τοὺς νόμους ὡς οὐ καλῶς*
*ἔθηκεν ὁ θεὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ γνώμης σοφῆς.*
*τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀδίκους βωμὸν οὐχ ἕζειν ἐχρῆν,*
*ἀλλ' ἐξελαύνειν· κτλ.* *Ion* 1312.

Cf. *Fr.* 1036 and contrast *Heraclid.* 101–104.

4 Herodotus vi. 86.

whether he might embezzle some money with which he had been intrusted. Socrates was a firm believer in oracles, yet his faith in the human intellect was great enough to make him condemn those who consulted the oracle in cases where thought and attention could give a solution.[1] Euripides went much further. Convinced that morals and religion lay in quite different spheres, he regarded oracles and seers as vicious frauds. He delights to make the Delphic Apollo or the diviner give utterance to a command from which the human mind shrinks in horror. Orestes is ordered by Apollo to murder his mother. Iphigenia and Macaria are offered as victims to the superstitious faith in seercraft. It is scarcely necessary to quote single utterances when the other evidence is so forcible, but the true feeling of the poet is perhaps expressed in the lines quoted in the note.[2]

Conscience.

If Euripides conceived morality to be the result of the capacity of the human soul to form ideals for itself, it is only to be expected that his dramas will represent conscience as the shame of the individual before himself. 'My hands are pure,' says the unhappy Phaedra, 'but my heart is stained.'[3] To Aeschylus the furies that pursued the matricide Orestes were objective realities; to Euripides they were the stings of conscience, transformed and personified by the paroxysms of his mad delirium. Asked during one of his saner moments what is the nature of the plague that is wearing him out, he replies 'Conscience, in that I know that I have committed awful

[1] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* A i. 9.

[2]
τὰ μάντεων
ἐσεῖδον ὡς φαῦλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ψευδῶν πλέα.
οὐκ ἦρ' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἐμπύρου φλογὸς
οὐδὲ πτερωτῶν φθέγματ'· εὔηθες δέ τοι
τὸ καὶ δοκεῖν ὄρνιθας ὠφελεῖν βροτούς.
*Hel.* 744.
τὸ μάντικον πᾶν σπέρμα φιλότιμον κακόν.
*Iph. Aul.* 520.

[3]
χεῖρες μὲν ἁγναί, φρὴν δ' ἔχει μιασμά τι.
*Hipp.* 317.

Cf. *Or.* 1604.

deeds.'[1] Sexual purity, a virtue conspicuous by its absence in Greek morality, is, as the character of Hippolytus proves, regarded by Euripides as a personal rather than a social virtue.[2]

(*b*) *φρήν* as object of judgment.

Believing that morality has its source in the human *φύσις* Euripides held that the full development of soul was the main thing to be considered in passing moral judgment upon human institutions. This must be borne in mind when examining the poet's views on (*a*) nobility, (*b*) slavery, (*c*) women, and (*d*) external goods. Here is clearly shown the interpretation put by Euripides upon the contrast between *φύσις* and *νόμος*.

Birth.

(*a*) The supreme test of nobility, he maintains, is nobleness. In other words, it is not birth in a 'noble' family which is of value, but the inheritance of a good character.[3] In this sense, good birth is a real blessing, and displays itself in *αἰδώς*, 'shamefastness.'[4] It is easily recognised, like the stamp upon metal.[5] Bastardy is no shame to the bastard. The *φύσις* of the illegitimate child is the same as that of the lawful offspring.[6]

Slavery.

(*b*) The same attitude is assumed towards the slave. Herein Euripides shows himself to be in advance, not

[1] ΜΕ. *τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;*
ΟΡ. *ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος.*
*Or.* 395.

[2] As, however, Euripides did not consider morality to be a question of outward acts, it is not surprising that he refused to attach any stain to the performance of natural functions, even in holy places. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1078–1081.

[3] *εἰς εὐγένειαν ὀλίγ' ἔχω φράσαι καλά.*
*ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλὸς εὐγενὴς ἐμοί γ' ἀνήρ,*
*ὁ δ' οὐ δίκαιος κἂν ἀμείνονος πατρὸς*
*Ζηνὸς πεφύκῃ, δυσγενὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ.*
*Fr.* 345.

[4] *τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς ἐκφέρεται πρὸς αἰδῶ.*
*Alc.* 601.

[5] *δεινὸς χαρακτὴρ κἀπίσημος ἐν βροτοῖς*
*ἐσθλῶν γενέσθαι.*
*Hec.* 379.

[6] *νόθοι τε πολλοὶ γνησίων ἀμείνονες.*
*Andr.* 638.
*ὀνόματι μεμπτὸν τὸ νόθον, ἡ φύσις δ' ἴση.*
*Fr.* 168.

only of Greek morality, but even of Greek ethics. No Greek philosopher dares to decry slavery. A few thinkers declared that it was *παρὰ φύσιν*, but we do not know their names.[1] But Euripides was consistent in maintaining that if moral value lies in human *φύσις* no stigma can rest upon the slave.[2] He is fond of bringing out this point by introducing into his dramas slaves of noble nature, as in the *Alcestis* and the *Helen*. Not unfrequently his characters are persons of noble birth, upon whom the misfortune of slavery has fallen owing to the vicissitudes of war. Above all, the chorus, which even in Euripides typifies to a certain extent the ideal spectator, is often composed of slaves. Instances are the choruses of the *Hecuba*, *Iphigenia among the Tauri*, *Ion*, and the *Trojan Women*.

And yet the poet is fully alive to the vices of the slave. Their god is their belly. The slave is always vicious.[3]

The inference Euripides would have us draw is surely obvious. The institution of slavery is a mere *νόμος* and a violation of *φύσις*. It is productive of vice and therefore an evil. But Euripides never says this directly. A master of innuendo, he attacks the practice by bringing out clearly the mischief of its results.

(*c*) This method of assailing the morality of the age may be more fully illustrated from the poet's treatment Women.

[1] Aristotle, *Pol.* 1253 b *τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διὸπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον γάρ.* Can A. be thinking of Euripides? Cf. *βίαιον* in this quotation and *βίᾳ* in *Hec.* 333.

[2]
*ἓν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,*
*τοὔνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων*
*οὐδὲν κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ᾖ.* *Ion* 854.
*πολλοῦσι δούλοις τοὔνομ' αἰσχρόν, ἡ δὲ φρὴν*
*τῶν οὐχὶ δούλων ἔστ' ἐλευθερωτέρα.* *Fr.* 828.

[3]
*οὕτω γὰρ κακὸν δούλων γένος·*
*γαστὴρ ἅπαντα, τοὐπίσω δ' οὐδὲν σκοπεῖ.*
*Fr.* 50.
*αἰαῖ· τὸ δοῦλον ὡς κακὸν πέφυκ' ἀεί,*
*τολμᾷ θ' ἃ μὴ χρή, τῇ βίᾳ κρατούμενον.*
*Hec.* 332.

of the position of women. The creator of an Alcestis and a Macaria must have been inspired with a fine ideal of what a true woman could be. Yet apart from those places where the current Greek opinions about women are expressed, the reader constantly meets furious outbursts against their spite, cunning and immorality. I will confine my attention to those passages which seem to throw a light npon the reason for the frequency of the attacks. The chief source of information is the *Medea*. The plot is the story of an injured wife and her savage revenge. She states her wrongs clearly in ll. 228–251.[1] The chief points upon which Medea lays stress are: that the husband is a woman's all in all; that woman comes unprepared to the new home she enters at marriage; that she has no social life to relieve the strain of the worries of home. A choral ode of the same play lays further stress upon the fact that women have no education or intellectual interests.[2] It is in perfect agreement with such a state of affairs that Hermione states as a matter of course that sexual matters are a woman's first interest.[3] In the *Hippolytus* it is the old nurse who tempts Phaedra to sin, and Hippolytus himself points out the evil that resulted from the secluded life of Greek women, with the opportunities it afforded to the treacherous *confidante*, although he would remedy it by the usual method that suggested itself to the mind of the ordinary Greek—stricter seclusion.[4] The Clytemnestra of the *Electra*

1 ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα, γιγνώσκεις καλῶς,
κάκιστος ἀνδρῶν ἐκβέβηχ' οὑμὸς πόσις. κτλ.

2 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν μοῦσα καὶ ἡμῖν,
ἡ προσομιλεῖ σοφίας ἕνεκεν·
πάσαισι μὲν οὔ· παῦρον δὲ γένος
(μίαν ἐν πολλαῖς εὕροις ἂν ἴσως)
οὐκ ἀπόμουσον τὸ γυναίκων.
*Med.* 1085.

3 AN. οὐκ αὖ σιωπῇ Κύπριδος ἀλγήσεις πέρι;
EP. τί δ'; οὐ γυναιξὶ ταῦτα πρῶτα πανταχοῦ;
*Andr.* 240.

4 χρὴν δ' εἰς γυναῖκα πρόσπολον μὲν οὐ περᾶν,
ἄφθογγα δ' αὐταῖς συγκατοικίζειν δάκη

admits that women are unchaste, but lays the blame upon the neglect of their husbands.[1] Although the general opinion is that women are of no account,[2] the typical Athenian Theseus admits that women have some capacity,[3] and one fragment declares that a man's best possession is a sympathetic wife.[4]

Surely Euripides wishes to teach us that the reason why women are so vicious is because their φύσις has been outraged. They are physically weak, and man has taken advantage of their weakness. Educate them, give them free intercourse with their kind, allow them more opportunities of developing their innate capacities, enable them to 'sympathise' with their husbands, and the result will be an ἄριστον κτῆμα. The likeness to Plato's position is very striking.

(*d*) It is reasonable to connect the disparagement of external goods, which occurs so frequently in Euripides, with his exaltation of the human soul. The same attitude of mind accounts for his love of intellectual Athens and his hatred of Sparta, with its hide-bound traditions and worship of athleticism.[5] But even a better indication of

External goods.

θηρῶν, ἵν' εἶχον μήτε προσφωνεῖν τινα
μήτ' ἐξ ἐκείνων φθέγμα δέξασθαι πάλιν.
νῦν δ' αἱ μὲν ἔνδον δρῶσιν αἱ κακαὶ κακὰ
βουλεύματ', ἔξω δ' ἐκφέρουσι πρόσπολοι.
*Hipp.* 645.

1 οἱ δ' αἴτιοι τῶνδ' οὐ κλύουσ' ἄνδρες κακῶς.
*Electra* 1040.

2 οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἀνὴρ μὲν ἐκ δόμων
θανὼν ποθεινός, τὰ δὲ γυναικὸς ἀσθενῆ.
*Iph. T.* 1005.
εἷς γ' ἀνὴρ κρείσσων γυναικῶν μυρίων δρῶν φάος.
*Iph. A.* 1394.

3 ὡς πολλά γ' ἐστὶ κἀπὸ θηλειῶν σοφά.
*Supplices* 294.

4 ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ κτῆμα συμπαθὴς γυνή.
*Fr.* 164.

5 ὦ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ἔχθιστοι βροτῶν
Σπάρτης ἔνοικοι:
*Andr.* 445.

Cf. *Heraclid.* 310 and *Suppl.* 187. Love of Athens is clearly marked in *Alcestis* 452, *Tro.* 208, *Med.* 824. For hatred of professional athleticism see *Fr.* 284.

Pessimism.

the poet's standpoint is his deep pessimism. Perhaps no literature is so pessimistic as Greek literature; certainly no Greek writer is so pessimistic as Euripides. The human *φύσις*, as it manifested itself during the troublous times of the Peloponnesian War, was after all a despicable thing. A man who believed that the end of existence was the perfection of the inner life must have felt crushed at the utter indifference to moral good which was everywhere prevalent in the Hellenic world. It is not, therefore, surprising to find Euripides lamenting that it were better never to have been born at all, and that the only hope for man is resignation.[1]

Conclusion.

Euripides discarded the popular faith on moral grounds, and could see no reason for supposing that there was a divine Providence guiding human affairs and working out the moral law. The unseen power that controls the universe (*φύσεος ἀνάγκη*) is probably non-moral. But he refused to infer that the result must be moral anarchy, for, whatever its origin, virtue is beautiful. It is just possible that he conceived the seed of morality in the human *φύσις* to have been planted by God and left to grow, but the evidence does not warrant a confident verdict, and he certainly put no faith in the *soi-disant* interpreters of the

1

*κράτιστον εἶναι φημὶ μὴ φῦναι βροτῷ.*
*Fr.* 287.

*ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἡμᾶς, σύλλογον ποιουμένους*
*τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,*
*τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον*
*χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων.*
*Fr.* 452.

*τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι κρεῖσσον ἢ φῦναι βροτούς.*
*Fr.* 900.

*οὐ βίος ἀληθῶς ὁ βίος, ἀλλὰ συμφορά.*
*Alc.* 802.

*οὐδὲν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ νῦν γένει.*
*Fr.* 696.

*ὅστις δ' ἀνάγκῃ συγκεχώρηκεν βροτῶν,*
*σοφὸς παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ θεῖ' ἐπίσταται.*
*Fr.* 956.

*ἔν ἐστι πάντων πρῶτον εἰδέναι βροτῷ,*
*φέρειν τὰ συμπίπτοντα μὴ παλιγκότως.*
*Fr.* 576.

divine will. More probably he did not feel it necessary to look beyond the human φύσις itself for the origin of moral ideas. φύσις develops with time and training, and hence the true contrast between φύσις and νόμος, the latter being manifestations of the former which become obsolete in time, in much the same way as a child outgrows the garments which once fitted his body. As necessary corollaries Euripides inferred :—

(*a*) that the cultivated human intelligence (φρήν, νοῦς) is the supreme judge in the moral sphere (pp. 21–24);

(*b*) that human institutions ought to be regulated by the principle that the human φύσις, wherever manifested, even in women and slaves, should be honoured and carefully cultivated (pp. 24–28).

The view here expressed is confirmed by the fact that the chief convictions of Euripides, stated or implied in his works, crystallise round it and become a unity, whereas in the usual accounts Euripides is said to have followed no system. *Vel hanc ob causam irritum fuerit perfectam et consummatam in eius ingenio quaerere philosophiam, qua ad eandem omnia normam et rationem revocentur et singula placita satis stabilita sint et inter se consentiant.*[1] It is true that a 'complete and perfect philosophy' cannot be found in Euripides, but I am certain that his main views are 'firmly established and self-consistent.'

[1] Nauck's *Euripides* (Teubner), vol. i. pp. xxx, xxxi.

# ADDITIONAL NOTES

## I

φύσις is the essence of a thing as determined by the generative act which caused its birth. Hence it can be used of the cosmos as opposed to chaos, and so the old philosophers called their treatises by the title περὶ φύσεως. But the word can equally well be applied to the permanent, inherited characteristics of a living creature. Thus it sometimes denotes a species or natural class. νόμος is strictly 'an apportionment.' From the original use are derived the meanings, 'custom,' 'ordinance.'

It is obvious that the force of the antithesis φύσις )( νόμος will vary according to the many shades of meaning which the words allow. But there is one idea dominating all forms of the contrast, namely, the opposition existing between that which is the result of natural generation and that which proceeds from an arbitrary or capricious act.

The atomists, using φύσις in the sense of cosmos, held that only the principles of the cosmos existed φύσει. Euripides sometimes uses φύσις in the same sense, but more often he attaches to it the meaning 'specific nature.' Hence it is practically equivalent to human nature, while νόμοι are the conventions that human beings impose upon one another.

## II

Since Euripides believed that morality has its origin in the human *φύσις*, not only virtue but also vice are due to the latter. *Fr.* 299 *ὡς ἔμφυτος μὲν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κάκη*: 609 *οὐκ ἔστι τὰ θεῶν ἄδικ', ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δὲ κακοῖς νοσοῦντα σύγχυσιν πολλὴν ἔχει.* So he is opposed to the *dictum* *οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός*. A man may know the good and yet not do it. *Hipp.* 380–383; *Med.* 1078–1080; *Fr.* 837; 838.

# INDEX OF IMPORTANT PASSAGES

## (*A*) RELIGION AND PROVIDENCE

[p=*Providence. The asterisk denotes especial importance.*]

*Alcestis* 39, 40; 56; 962-984 (p); *Bacchae* 72-82; 200-209; 221-225; 255-258; 847-861; 890-896; *Hecuba* 163, 164; 488-491* (p); 799-801*; 958-960* (p); 1295 (p); *Helena* 711, 712; 759, 760 (p); *Electra* 190-197; 583, 584 (p); 743, 744; 971; 1169 (p); 1245; *Heraclidae* 350, 351; 718, 719; *Hercules Furens* 62; 212; 339-347*; 1135 (p); 1243; 1308-1310; 1316-1319; 1340-1346*; *Supplices* 139; 195-249[1] (p); 301-303; 504, 505* (p); 594-597* (p); 610-613; 731-733; *Hippolytus* 952-954* (Orphism); 1363-1369* (p); *Iph. in Aul.* 1034; 1189, 1190; *Iph. in T.* 380-391*; 570-575*; 711-715*; 975-978; 1012-1015; *Ion* 252-254; 331-368; 370-380*; 436-451*; 551-555*; 876-922*; 1523-1527; 1615-1622*; *Orestes* 416-418; 1179, 1180 (p); *Troades* 26, 27 (p); 469-471; 884-888* (p); *Fragments* 149 (p); 150 (p); 209; 224 (p): 256; 257 (p); 288; 354 (p); 355 (p); 395 (p); 401 (p); 475 (Orphism); 478 (ἀνάγκη[2]); 483; 493; 508 (p); 509 (p); 558 (p); 757 (the law of nature not evil); 832* (p); 893 (p); 904; 905 (p); 935; 942 (p); 970 (p); 981 (p); 1007*.

Besides the above, whatever the 'gods' say in the prologues and *dénouements* should be considered important.

### DIVINATION

*Helena* 744-757; 919-923; 1626; *Electra* 399, 400; 981; *Supplices* 155; *Iph. in Aul.* 956; *Fr.* 793*; 963.

### SANCTUARY

*Heraclidae* 101-104; 253-273; *Ion* 1312-1319*; *Fr.* 1036*.

[1] Cf. Xen. *Mem.* A iv.
[2] For φύσις and ἀνάγκη see *Troades* 886 and *Fr.* 902.

### IMMORTALITY

*Alcestis* 364; 381; 995-1005*; *Hecuba* 422; *Helena* 1014-1016*; 1421; *Electra* 682-684; *Heraclidae* 592-594*; *Supplices* 531-536; *Iph. in Aul.* 1250-1252; *Troades* 632; *Fr.* 536; 537; 639*; 734.

### (*B*) POLITICS AND SOCIETY

*Alcestis* 452 (Athens); *Andromache* 173-176 (barbarians); 445-453* (Sparta); 699-702 (democracy); *Hecuba* 123-129 (Ath.); 254-257 (demo.); *Heraclidae* 181, 182 (Ath.); 901-903* (Sp.); *Supplices* 187-190* (Sp.); 353 (Ath.); 376-380 (Ath.); *Hippolytus* 486-489 (demagogues); *Iph. in Aul.* 1400, 1401 (barb.); *Ion* 29, 30 (Ath.); 262 (Ath.); 621-633 (tyranny and demo.); 1038 (Ath.); *Medea* 119-121 (tyr.); 461-463 (exile); 536-544* (Greece and barb.); 649-651 (love of country); 824-845* (Ath.); *Orestes* 696-703 (demo.); 772 (demo.); 901-913 (demagogues); 1506-1525* (barb.); *Troades* 207-209 (Ath.); 386, 387* (patriotism); *Phoenissae* 388, 389* (exile); 406 (love of country); 512-516; *Fr.* 93 (demo.); 193 (ἀπράγμων); 194 (ἀπράγμων); 608 (tyr.); 628* (demo.); 879 (patriotism); 902 (ἀπράγμων); 1034*(cosmopolitanism).

### FRIENDSHIP

*Andromache* 376, 377*; *Hercules Fur.* 57-59; 1338; 1425, 1426; *Iph. in Aul.* 334; 408; *Iph. in T.* 498; 674-676; 684-686; *Ion* 730; *Orestes* 735; 804; 806; 1014, 1015; 1072; 1155, 1156; *Fr.* 465; 894.

(Mercy to enemies) *Heraclidae* 966*; (*lex talionis*) *Andromache* 437, 438; *Hecuba* 844, 845; *Ion* 1046, 1047; *Medea* 807-810; *Orestes* 413; *Fr.* 1076, 1077.

### ANIMALS

*Hercules Fur.* 1386-1388 (Verrall, *Four Plays of E.* p. 194); *Hippolytus* 110-112; 1219; 1240; *Ion* 179; 1202-1205.

### (*C*) FAMILY LIFE

[w = *Women or married life*; c = *Children.*]

*Alcestis* 309-319 (step-mother); 415* (motherhood); 473-475 (w); 879-880 (w); 882-888 (c); *Andromache* 173-180 (w); 241 (w); 352-354 (w); 373 (w); *Hecuba* 1181, 1182 (w); *Electra* 931-933 (w); 1035-1040 (w); 1051-1053 (w); 1072-1075 (w); 1097-1099 (w); *Heraclidae* 476, 477 (w); *Hercules Fur.* 280, 281 (c); 574-578 (c); 634, 635 (c); *Supplices* 40, 41 (w); 294 (w); 1099-1103 (sons and daughters); *Hippolytus* 616-668* (w); 640 (w); 966 (w); *Iph. in Aul.* 376, 377 (brothers); 508-510 (brothers); 917 (motherhood); 1157-1161 (w); 1394 (w); *Iph. in T.* 57 (c); 1005, 1006 (w); 1298 (w); *Ion* 398-400* (w); 472-491* (c); 1090-1105 (w); *Medea* 229-266* (w); 407-

409 (w); 1033-1035 (c); 1081-1093* (w); 1094-1115* (c); 1206-1210 (c); *Phoenissae* 198-201 (w); 355, 356 (w and c): 374, 375 (brothers); *Fr.* 36 (w); 104 (c); 111 (honour to parents); 318* (c); 320 (w); 321 (w); 322 (w); 339 (step-children); 360* (children and parents); 405, 406, 466, 467, 496, 497, 499, 500, 501, 503, 504, 547, 548, 549, 658,* 673, 805, 819 (all w); 848 (honour to parents); 901* (w); 943 (honour to parents); 1042 (w); 1043 (w).

**SLAVERY**

*Alcestis* 194, 195; 210, 211; 769, 770; 813; 948, 949; *Andromache* 56-59; 89, 90; *Hecuba* 332, 333; *Helena* 728-731; *Electra* 633; *Iph. in Aul.* 1400, 1401; *Ion* 854-856*; *Fr.* 50; 87; 216; 515; 533; 828; 966.

**(*D*) THE INDIVIDUAL**

(Good Birth) *Alcestis* 601; *Andromache* 1279-1283; *Hecuba* 379-381; 592-602; *Electra* 37, 38; 367-390*; 550, 551; *Heraclidae* 297-301; *Ion* 239, 240; *Fr.* 9; 22; 53; 54; 168; 234; 331; 344; 345*; 378; 514; 529; 530; 531; 739; 966; 1051.

(External Goods) *Alcestis* 163-169; *Electra* 37, 38; 362, 363; 426-431; *Hercules Fur.* 303, 304; 511, 512; 780; *Medea* 561; *Phoenissae* 405; 554; 597; *Fr.* 55; 80*; 96; 143; 164*; 248*; 249; 250; 251; 326; 327; 328; 329; 364*; 441; 461; 642; 773; 810; 884*.

(Pessimism) *Alcestis* 802; *Hecuba* 956-961; *Helena* 298; *Hippolytus* 189*; 1102-1110; *Medea* 195, 196; 1224; *Fr.* 287; 452; 696; 956.

(Old Age) *Supplices* 1088-1113; *Fr.* 579; 580; 638; 802; 1065.

(Suicide) *Helena* 96, 97; 298-302; *Hercules Furens* 1210-1212; *Troades* 1012-1014.

(Beauty) *Andromache* 207, 208; *Helena* 304, 305; *Fr.* 552*; 921.

## φύσις ἀνθρωπίνη.

*Bacchae* 314, 315 (σωφρονεῖν in φύσις); 895, 896; *Helena* 1002, 1003 (ἱερὸν δίκης ἐν τῇ φύσει); *Electra* 941; *Hippolytus* 79, 80 (σωφρονεῖν in φύσις); *Orestes* 126, 127 (ὦ φύσις, ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὡς μέγ' εἶ κακόν, σωτήριόν τε τοῖς καλῶς κεκτημένοις); *Ion* 642-644 (ὃ δ' εὐκτὸν ἀνθρώποισι, πᾶν ὅπουσοῦν ᾖ, δίκαιον εἶναί μ' ὁ νόμος ἡ φύσις θ' ἅμα παρεῖχε τῷ θεῷ); *Fr.* 168; 170; 187; 205*; 344; 378; 620; 635; 807; 831; 912; 1050 (ἡ φύσις ἑκάστῳ τοῦ γένους ἐστὶν πατρίς).

## φρήν.

*Hippolytus* 317; *Orestes* 1604; *Fr.* 199; 211; 828. Cf. *Fr.* 284 on athletics.

## νοῦς.

*Troades* 987, 988 (chastity in νοῦς); *Fr.* 211; 552; 1007 (ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεός). Cf. *Fr.* 894 (the σοφός is a true φίλος).

PERSONAL VIRTUE

*Electra* 50, 51; 256 (moral purity); *Hippolytus* 102 (moral purity); 316, 317 (conscience); 612 (oath); *Iph. in Aul.* 394 (oath); 1005 (oath); *Medea* 439-440; *Orestes* 395, 396* (conscience); 492 (virtue beautiful); *Fr.* 11 (virtue shown in death); 291 (truth); 737 (truth): 1017 (virtue beautiful); 299*; 609* (origin of evil is in men).

(Idleness and work) *Electra* 80, 81; *Fr.* 37; 238; 239; 242; 396; 464; 477; 719.

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